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Abstract
Using Bank of England voting data, we show empirically that members’ votes are driven by heteroge-
neous individual assessments of the economy as well as their individual policy preferences. Estimates
indicate that internal committee members form more precise assessments than externals and are also
more hawkish. The estimates allow the first quantification of the gain due to information aggregation
on monetary policy committees. The marginal gain from additional committee members tapers quickly
after five members. There is no evidence of gains through externals’ moderating internals’ preferences.
A relatively small committee of highly informed internal members emerges as a desirable committee
structure.
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1 Introduction
What role do private assessments of economic conditions play in explaining individual voting behavior on the
Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)? While empirical work focuses largely on preference
differences (hawkishness or dovishness) as the primary driver of individual voting differences, both committee
designers and theoretical models emphasize that policymakers may differ in their assessments of economic
conditions. Even if they share the same preferences, different beliefs on such conditions can lead to different
votes. Pooling of private assessments also provides a natural channel for understanding why committees
outperform individuals, as found in experimental work (Blinder and Morgan, 2005; Lombardelli et al., 2005).
Our empirical approach allows both differences in preferences and in private assessments to play a role in
committee decisions.
The first major contribution of this paper is to estimate a model of equilibrium voting behavior using
the individual voting record of the MPC. In the model, the individual structural parameters of interest are
preferences and the precision of private assessments, which we call expertise. The estimation follows the
two-step approach of Iaryczower and Shum (2012), who estimate these quantities for US Supreme Court
justices. The model is estimated both under the assumption that voting is sincere, in which case members
behave as if their votes determine policy, and strategic, in which case members condition their votes on
being pivotal. These assumptions do not change estimates of expertise, but do change those of preferences.
A model evaluation exercise based on out-of-sample prediction shows that sincere voting explains the data
modestly better than strategic voting.1
The expertise estimates show that private assessments play an important role in individual voting behav-
ior. In meetings with the greatest uncertainty about the state of the economy, an individual member is up
to 40 percentage points more likely to make the correct decision relative to a model in which private views
play no role. Modelling private views is therefore important for explaining voting behavior, and differences
in these views can be expected to lead to different votes even when members share the same preferences.
The estimates also allow one to explore differences between externally appointed experts—members
appointed solely to make the decision each month—and internal members—those who also have executive
responsibilities in the central bank. Some countries (for example, the UK, Poland, and Hungary) make use of
externals, presumably to take advantage of diversity, while others (for example, the USA and Sweden) do not.
In line with the existing literature (e.g. Gerlach-Kristen, 2003, and references below), internals’ estimated
preferences are significantly more hawkish, but our novel finding is that they have higher estimated expertise.
This finding implies that the justification for externals’ inclusion from a purely informational perspective
requires further thinking.
To try to uncover the source of these differences, we examine the behavior of members who have worked
in central banking prior to their MPC appointment—insiders—in order to see whether prior experience or
current position matters most for the behavior of internals. Estimates show that insiders are more hawkish
and have more expertise than outsiders, which suggests that it is prior experience as central bankers rather
than holding a senior position in the central bank that drives the internal-external differences.2
Optimal committee design is an important and open area in monetary policy (Reis, 2013). The second
major contribution in this paper is to use the estimated parameters to assess how different committee
structures affect the quality of decision making via counterfactual simulations. The first aspect of committee
design considered is the effect of size. A well-known hypothesis is that committees outperform individuals
because they aggregate dispersed private information (see Gerlach-Kristen (2006) or Blinder (2007) for recent
discussions of this in the context of monetary policy). A major advantage of the estimation approach is that
one can measure the extent of these gains in a real-world committee.
In periods in which the economic environment is most uncertain, moving from an individual expert to a
committee structure improves decision making substantially, although the gains decline rather quickly. For
example, a committee of five internal members is between 7 and 11 percentage points more likely to make the
correct decision than an individual internal member. This indicates that the gain from committees’ pooling
1The results described here correspond to the sincere model, but results for both assumptions are contained either in the
main text or the accompanying online appendix.
2We also examine splits based on age, education and prior career. While in no case are there significant preference (both
sincere and strategic) or expertise differences, in all cases members’ decisions are importantly influenced by their private
assessments of the economic situation. This corroborates the view that members’ individual views of the unknown state of
economy are an important driver of voting heterogeneity.
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imperfect knowledge is potentially significant. However, the marginal benefit of an additional member tapers
quite quickly after about five members; the marginal gain from adding four additional internal members,
making a committee of nine internal members, is only about 1-3 percentage points. The overall message is
that the additional members on large committees, such as the 24-member Governing Council of the ECB, may
improve decision making only marginally if expertise is sufficiently high. Given the potentially large costs
from adding more and more members, such as information exchange problems and free-riding by members
(see Sibert, 2006, for a discussion), a smaller committee is likely to be better.
The second design issue explored is whether, as argued by Blinder (2007), external members can add
value through moderating internals’ hawkish preferences. This would support their inclusion in committees
despite their lower expertise. When the economic data broadly points to the high interest rate likely being
correct, the preference moderation effect indeed arises because internals are less willing to follow private
signals that low rates should be chosen. But, the moderation effect is not found to be large enough to fully
overturn the effect of lower expertise, and internal and external members perform equally well. Moreover,
when economic data suggests that the low interest rate is likely correct, internals’ hawkish preferences work
to offset externals’ rigid decision making, amplifying internals outperformance of externals. Overall, the
gains and the losses from preference moderation should roughly cancel out on average.
In short, a relatively small, homogenous committee of members with high expertise performs very well
even if they have a hawkish bias. Of course, further work remains to be done on the exact nature of
deliberation in the committee meeting, and alternative sources of value that external members might bring.
Still though, the paper is the first to separately identify the role of preferences and individual assessments
in monetary policymaking, and so provides potentially valuable facts for extending our knowledge of both
the how and why of policymaking by committee.
The paper is related to two main strands of the existing literature. First, there is a growing literature on
all aspects of the use of committees to make monetary policy decisions: this includes important summaries of
the state of the knowledge (Gerling et al., 2005; Blinder, 2007), issues of agenda-setting (Riboni and Ruge-
Murcia, 2010), reputation-building on monetary policy committees (Sibert, 2003; Hansen and McMahon,
2013), credibility of committees (Mihov and Sibert, 2006), and the desirability of a committee over an
individual when there is uncertainty about the economic situation (Gerlach-Kristen, 2006). Committee
decision making has also been extensively studied by social psychologists and Sibert (2006) provides a
discussion of the main findings and how it applies to monetary policy committees. Secondly, there are a
number of other papers that specifically study the MPC and internal-external differences within it including
Gerlach-Kristen (2003); Bhattacharjee and Holly (2005); Spencer (2006); Besley et al. (2008); Harris et al.
(2011) and Hix et al. (2010). As mentioned above, these all focus exclusively on preference differences, with
the general conclusion that external members are more dovish the internals.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information on the MPC.
Then, section 3 presents the voting model that serves as the basis of the empirical analysis. Section 4 details
the estimation strategy and section 5 describes the data used to implement the strategy. The estimation
results are presented in section 6. Section 7 presents counterfactual results on the committee structure and
section 8 concludes.
2 The Monetary Policy Committee
The MPC first convened on 6 June 1997, and has met every month since. Its remit, as defined in the Bank
of England Act (1998), is to “maintain price stability, and subject to that, to support the economic policy of
Her Majesty’s government, including its objectives for growth and employment.” In practice, the committee
seeks to achieve a symmetric target inflation rate of 2%, based on the Consumer Price Index.3 At the end
of each meeting, the Governor proposes an interest rate decision that he or she believes will command a
majority and each member then chooses whether to agree with the Governor’s proposal, or dissent and state
their preferred alternative interest rate. Each member’s vote is published as part of otherwise unattributed
minutes. Throughout, the analysis considers the MPC voting records between June 1997 and March 2009,
when the main focus of the decision (temporarily) shifted to asset purchase decisions related to quantitative
3There was a change from RPIX to CPI as the measure of inflation in January 2004, and with this change, the inflation
target was reduced from 2.5% to 2%.
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easing.4 The voting records indicate both the proposed interest rate decision (such as +50 basis points), as
well as the alternative preference for those who do not back the proposal (such as +25bps).5
The MPC provides a useful setting for the analysis because there is a one-person, one-vote philosophy: the
Bank encourages members to simply determine the rate of interest that they feel is most likely to achieve the
inflation target (Bank of England, 2010) and majority vote determines the outcome. As such, the observed
votes should reflect members’ genuine policy preferences. Consistent with this philosophy, the MPC displays
substantial dissent: 64% of the 142 meetings in the sample have at least one deviation from the committee
majority and within the set of non-unanimous meetings, 5-4 and 6-3 decisions are not uncommon.
Also useful is that the MPC is made up of five internal and four external members. Internals serve as
executives of the Bank of England: the Governor, two Deputy Governors, the Chief Economist, and the
Executive Director for Markets. The Chancellor of the Exchequer appoints externals (subject to approval
from the Treasury Select Committee) from outside the Bank.6 There are no restrictions on who can serve
as external members, and they have come from many different backgrounds. The sample contains a total of
13 internal and 14 external members. Every member receives all Bank of England staff briefings related to
monetary policy and attends the monthly meetings in full. Bar the governors who serve five year terms, all
other members serve three year terms. When members’ terms end, they can either be replaced or reappointed.
Table 1 splits the members that served on the MPC during the sample by internal and external (their
tenure is reported in brackets). For later use in the analysis, it also reports whether or not members had
worked within the Bank at some point prior to their appointment to the MPC (insiders versus outsiders).
3 Model
This section presents a reduced-form model of monetary policy decision making under uncertainty on which
the estimation exercise is based. Members must choose one of two interest rates—one higher than another—to
implement in response to an unobserved inflationary state. The two rates in each meeting are called the
agenda. All members prefer the higher (lower) rate when there is more (less) inflationary pressure. However
members differ in how averse they are to wrongly choosing low interest rates and such member-specific
preferences or biases determine how much evidence they need that the economy is inflationary in order to
vote high. Members also form individual assessments of the state of the economy on the basis of public
information and the realization of a privately observed signal, whose precision measures expertise. The
model yields a voting rule in which members vote for high rates if and only if they are sufficiently convinced
that the economy is in an inflationary state. The formal structure of the model is closest to that in Duggan
and Martinelli (2001), who study voting over binary outcomes with continuous signals. The reduced form
is for clarity and the online appendix shows that threshold voting rules also emerge within a standard New
Keynesian model based on Clarida et al. (1999) and Gal´ı (2008).
A more big-picture issue is how to interpret preferences and private signals in the monetary policy
context. As Blinder (2007) points out, there are several admissible interpretations. Members might literally
have different preferences over the trade off between inflation and unemployment, but they might also have
different models of the macroeconomy, models with a particular bias, in their heads. A member who analyzes
an issue using a model that more typically leads to a recommendation for higher interest rates would have
a hawkish bias, which is observationally equivalent to hawkish preferences. In terms of private assessments,
it could be that members literally have private information from their personal contacts which they add to
the common data all members receive prior to voting. Alternatively, it could be that the diverse models and
forecasting methods that members use give them imperfect, heterogeneous views about underlying economic
conditions. Or, it could be that even with the same preferences and information set, heterogeneity in cognitive
4These data are available from the Bank of England website. We use each regular MPC meetings in this period but we drop
from the dataset the (unanimous) emergency meeting held after 9/11.
5Before June 1998 there is information about whether members preferred higher or lower interest rates compared with the
decision, but not about their actual preferred rate. In these cases, we treat a member’s vote as either 25 basis points higher or
lower than the decision, in the direction of disagreement. Given how we use the voting data, discussed below, this assumption
has no implications for our analysis.
6The Bank’s explicit aim in appointing external members is their heterogeneity vis-a`-vis internal members. According to
Bank of England (2010), external appointments “ensure that the MPC benefits from thinking and expertise in addition to that
gained inside the Bank of England.”
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Table 1: MPC Members
Appointment
External Internal
C
en
tr
al
B
an
k
C
ar
ee
r Outsider
C. Allsopp (06/00-05/03)
K. Barker (06/01-03/09)
M. Bell (06/02-06/05) C. Bean (10/00-03/09)
T. Besley (06/06-03/09) D. Clementi (11/97-08/02)
D. Blanchflower (06/06-03/09) J. Gieve (01/06-03/09)
A. Budd (12/97-05/99) A. Large (11/02-01/06)
W. Buiter (06/97-05/00) R. Lomax (07/03-06/08)
D. Julius (11/97-05/01) J. Vickers (06/98-11/00)
R. Lambert (06/03-03/06)
S. Nickell (06/00-05/06)
A. Sentance (10/06-03/09)
S. Wadhwani (06/99-05/02)
D. Walton (07/05-06/06)
Insider
E. George (06/97-06/03)
H. Davies (06/97-07/97)
P. Fisher (03/09-03/09)
C. Goodhart (06/97-05/00) S. Dale (07/08-03/09)
I. Plenderleith (06/97-05/02)
M. King (06/97-03/09)
P. Tucker (06/02-03/09)
Notes: This table shows committee members serving on the MPC for the period 06/97-03/09 and splits them into
whether they are internal or external (horizontal axis), and whether they are insiders or outsiders (vertical axis).
The former distinction is based on how they are appointed while the latter is determined by whether they had
prior experience in the Bank of England. For example, Eddie George served from 06/97 to 06/03 as an internal
member who was also an insider on account of his career at the Bank of England. In contrast, Kate Barker, who
served from 06/01 to 03/09, was appointed as an external member and had no prior experience in the Bank before
her appointment.
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processing ability, of the sort emphasized in the limited attention literature (discussed, for example, in Sims,
2010), leads each member to come to a different view.
3.1 Member preferences
In each period t the committee implements a decision dt ∈ {0, 1}, where 0 represents the lower of two possible
rate changes and 1 the higher. The agenda is exogenous.7 The restriction to a two-decision agenda rarely
binds since there are three unique votes in only 7 of the 142 meetings in our sample and no meetings with
four or more unique votes (the appendix describes how these anomalies are treated). An odd number N of
voters compose the committee. Each one chooses a vote vit ∈ {0, 1} each period and dt = 1 if and only if∑
i vit ≥ N+12 .
Member i’s preferences over dt depend on a state ωt, and are represented by ui (dt | ωt). ωt represents
unknown economic conditions relevant to inflation, for example the magnitude of a demand shock or the
output gap of the economy. ωt = 1 is the high interest rate state and ωt = 0 is the low interest rate state.
Preferences are such that ui (0 | 0) = ui (1 | 1) = 0, ui (0 | 1) = −θi, and ui (1 | 0) = −(1 − θi). In this
formulation, all members agree that decision dt = ωt is best, but have different payoffs from mismatches in
different states. A member with a higher θi suffers more when the committee incorrectly chooses the lower
rate than when it wrongly chooses the higher rate. We therefore interpret him as being more hawkish while
a member with a lower θi is more dovish.
3.2 Member beliefs and expertise
Prior to voting, members form beliefs on ωt by relying on two sources. First, there is public information
about the current state of the economy like market data, staff forecasts, and each others’ stated opinions.
Let qt ≡ Pr [ωt = 1 ] denote the common prior belief that the economy is in the high state that is consistent
with this information. Second, member i privately observes the signal sit | ωt ∼ N(ωt, σ2i ). These signals are
independent conditional on ωt. σi measures member i’s expertise or the precisions of his private assessment.
Member i’s posterior belief on the state—ω̂it ≡ Pr [ωt = 1 | sit ]—is formed via Bayes’ Rule. Basic
manipulations of the normal density yield the expression
ln
[
ω̂it
1− ω̂it
]
= ln
[
qt
1− qt
]
+
2sit − 1
2σ2i
. (1)
Whenever σi < ∞, then ω̂it 6= ω̂jt generically for any two distinct members i and j. Even if members
draw identically distributed signals, they will have divergent private assessments. A separate point is that if
members differ in their expertise, they will put different weights on their private signals such that members
with more accurate assessments will rely more on their own view and less on the public signal.
Several clarifications about the assumed information structure are worth making. One concern is that
members have heterogeneous priors qit. In this framework, such heterogeneity would be impossible to
distinguish from heterogeneity in θi—both are individual characteristics that bias member i towards one of
the interest rates relative to his colleagues. One can see this formally in the voting rules derived in the next
subsection: qit and θi would enter symmetrically in them. So, the main implication of heterogeneous priors
is that they require a broader interpretation of the θ estimates to admit sources of bias apart from pure
preferences. Importantly, our estimates of σi should remain unaffected.
Second, qt represents members’ prior belief at the moment at which they vote. If members reveal
to colleagues their private signals prior to voting, as in Gerlach-Kristen (2006), then qt pools all private
assessments and becomes the common, shared belief. In this sense, the estimates of 1σi represent the upper
bound on precision.
A final concern is that there is serial correlation in individual votes driven by persistent private signals.
But serial correlation in votes can be also be driven by serial correlation in the common prior. Modelling
persistent private signals requires a significantly more complex information structure and decision rule, and
estimating such models is not yet feasible. On the other hand, persistence in the prior is not incompatible
with the model because the decision rules are already written conditional on qt. In order to try and address
7See Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010) for a model of endogenous agendas.
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this concern, we have explored this issue empirically (the full details are provided in the online appendix).
While members’ votes are serially correlated, once we control for the prior, the AR(1) coefficient is no longer
significant. As such, the paper proceeds under the assumption that signals are serially uncorrelated.
3.3 How members vote given their preferences and beliefs
There are two assumptions the voting literature makes about voting behavior in committees (Austen-Smith
and Banks, 1996). First, when members vote sincerely they behave as if they get utility from matching their
vote to the state. Under this assumption member i’s expected utility from vit = 1 is −(1−θi) Pr [ωt = 0 | sit ],
while his expected utility from vit = 0 is −θi Pr [ωt = 0 | sit ]. He thus chooses vit = 1 whenever
ln
[
ω̂it
1− ω̂it
]
≥ 1− θi
θi
(2)
which implies choosing vit = 1 whenever
sit ≥ 1
2
− σ2i
[
ln
(
θi
1− θi
)
+ ln
(
qt
1− qt
)]
≡ s∗it(SIN). (3)
In other words, member i adopts a threshold voting rule in which he votes for high rates if and only if his
signal provides sufficient evidence for the high state having arisen. This threshold is both time and member
specific, and depends on both preferences and expertise. As mentioned above, if the model had heterogeneous
priors, the qit term would enter the threshold alongside θi.
An alternative assumption is that committee members behave strategically. This requires modelling
players’ voting rules as strategies in a Bayesian game. The main modification from the sincere case is that
members only condition their votes on the event in which they are pivotal for the committee’s decision—that
is, that there are exactly N−12 votes for dt = 0 and
N−1
2 votes for dt = 1. In the spirit of the results in
Duggan and Martinelli (2001), all voters continue to adopt a cutoff voting rule such that i votes 1 whenever
Pr
[
PIVi
∣∣ s∗−i, ωt = 1 ]
Pr
[
PIVi
∣∣ s∗−i, ωt = 0 ] ln
[
ω̂it
1− ω̂it
]
≥ 1− θi
θi
, (4)
where Pr
[
PIVi
∣∣ s∗−i, ωt ] is the probability that he is pivotal given other members’ cutoffs s∗−i and the
inflation state ωt. Thus, member i selects vit = 1 if and only if
sit ≥ 1
2
− σ2i
[
ln
(
θi
1− θi
)
+ ln
(
qt
1− qt
)
+ ln
(
Pr
[
PIVi
∣∣ s∗−i, ωt = 1 ]
Pr
[
PIVi
∣∣ s∗−i, ωt = 0 ]
)]
≡ s∗it(STR). (5)
An equilibrium is a collection of these cutoffs {s∗it(STR)}Ni=1 such that all N equations described in (5)
are satisfied. Clearly in general s∗it(STR) 6= s∗it(SIN), and obtaining a closed form solution for s∗it(STR)
is not possible.8 Since both appear in the literature, the paper estimates both models, and compares the
goodness-of-fit of both models in section 6.2.
4 Econometric Methodology
In order to derive the likelihood function for observed votes, consider a meeting at time t. Under the high
inflation state, member i votes for the low rate with probability Φ
(
s∗it(·)−1
σi
)
and for the high rate with
probability 1−Φ
(
s∗it(·)−1
σi
)
. Under the low inflation state, the corresponding expressions are Φ
(
s∗it(·)
σi
)
and
1−Φ
(
s∗it(·)
σi
)
. The probabilities that the economy is in the high and low inflation states are qt and (1− qt),
8In principle there can be multiple equilibria of the strategic voting game corresponding to different cutoffs, but specifying
which one is being played is not important for the estimation strategy.
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respectively. Therefore, the likelihood function given s∗it(·) and σi is:
∏
t
qt ∏
i∈M(t)
(κ1it)
vit (1− κ1it)1−vit + (1− qt)
∏
i∈M(t)
(κ0it)
vit (1− κ0it)1−vit
 (6)
where
κ1it ≡ 1− Φ
(
s∗it (·)− 1
σi
)
and κ0it ≡ 1− Φ
(
s∗it (·)
σi
)
. (7)
The term in square brackets in (6) is the likelihood of observing the votes in meeting t, which is then
multiplied across all meetings to form the overall likelihood.
To obtain estimates of θi and σi, we follow the two-step estimation approach of Iaryczower and Shum
(2012) and the literature that estimates games more broadly (see the papers cited in Pesendorder and
Takahashi, 2013). The general idea is to estimate choice—in this case vote—probabilities in a first stage
with flexible functional forms that depend on observed covariates. These first-stage coefficient estimates
are not themselves linked to any underlying economic model. Then, in the second stage, the estimated
probabilities are linked to an economic model that explains them, from which structural parameters are
backed out. It is important that these structural parameters are identified given the estimated probabilities
although we delay a discussion of the intuition for such identification until the next subsection.
The model for the prior (or, in statistical language, the mixing probability) is
qt =
exp
(
α0 + α1q
R
t + α2q
M
t
)
1 + exp
(
α0 + α1qRt + α2q
M
t
) , (8)
where qRt and q
M
t are proxy variables correlated with the true qt described below. In principle, the true
qt depends on all available public information at date t, including macroeconomic aggregates and financial
variables. Following Imai and Tingley (2012), we favor parsimony in the model and therefore use two
statistics that should capture all of the available information as it pertains to expectations of what the MPC
will do. We include both a market survey measure and data on market expectations derived from option
prices because, as we describe in more detail below, both have advantages and disadvantages.
The model for the κ terms is
κ0it =
exp (β · Sit)
1 + exp (β · Sit) and κ1it =
κ0it + exp (γ · Sit)
1 + exp (γ · Sit) (9)
where Sit =
(
1, Di, q
R
t , q
M
t , Di · qRt , Di · qMt , Zt
)
is a vector of covariates. Here Di are dummy variables that
group members into categories across which we wish to compare preferences and expertise. For example, the
main estimates compare internal and external members, so the model contains a single dummy that equals
one if and only if member i is an internal. Zt a vector of meeting-specific variables that potentially affect
voters’ tradeoff between errors in states 0 and 1 without influencing their beliefs on economic conditions.
The interactions between Di and the proxies for the prior control for members with different signal precisions
reacting differently to changes in the prior. The dependence of κ1 on κ0 ensures that κ1 ≥ κ0, which is
implied by the model and necessary for identifying the first stage parameters β and γ. Without the restriction
that κ1 ≥ κ0, assigning individual votes to the cluster corresponding to the correct inflationary state is not
possible.
Given this model, we estimate the α, β, and γ via maximum likelihood applied to (6), as do Iaryczower
and Shum (2012). From these estimates, one obtains fitted values q̂t, κ̂0it, and κ̂1it. Using the definitions in
(7), one can recover estimates for signal accuracy and equilibrium voting threshold under both the sincere
and strategic voting models as follows:
σ̂it =
1
Φ−1 (1− κ̂0it)− Φ−1 (1− κ̂1it) and ŝ
∗
it =
Φ−1 (1− κ̂0it)
Φ−1 (1− κ̂0it) + Φ−1 (κ̂1it) . (10)
Obtaining estimates for the preference parameter θ requires specifying the sincere or strategic model. Under
the former, θ̂it can be obtained by plugging q̂t, σ̂it, and ŝ
∗
it into the equations defined in (3) and solving
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directly. Under the latter, plugging q̂t, σ̂it, and ŝ
∗
it into equation (5) generates a system of equations to solve
for θ̂it.
The estimated parameters in the econometric model are the first stage coefficients, which do not vary
over time. The mapping of these parameter estimates into the second stage, however, delivers an estimate of
σi and θi for each separate meeting because of variation in the proxies q
R
t and q
M
t . We construct estimates of
σi and θi—σ̂i and θ̂i—by averaging σ̂it and θ̂it over time, which should cancel out measurement error in the
relationship between qRt and q
M
t and the true qt. Monte Carlo exercises, presented in the online appendix,
show that σ̂it and θ̂it indeed vary over time when recovered from voting datasets generated with constant σi
and θi parameters, but that averaging produces estimates centered on the true values.
4.1 Intuition for identification of θ and σ
The key link between the behavioral model and empirical exercise comes via the extraction of θ and σ from
the estimated state-contingent voting probabilities κ̂0 and κ̂1. This section provides an intuitive argument
for why they are identified. Figure 1 plots κ0 and κ1—the theoretical probabilities of voting for the high
rate in states 0 and 1, respectively—for different member types as a function of the prior qt in the case of
sincere voting. The intuition for the strategic model is essentially the same.
Figures 1a and 1b compare two members who have the same signal precision (σ = 0.5) but one is a hawk
(θH = 0.65) and one is a dove (θD = 0.35). As the prior increases, both have a higher chance of voting for
the high rate. However, the hawk always has higher probability of choosing the high rate than the dove
because he is inherently more inflation-averse. Formally, κH0 ≥ κD0 and κH1 ≥ κD1 .
Now consider two members who have the same preferences (θ = 0.5) but different signal precisions. There
is a more-expert (σME = 0.4) and a less-expert (σLE = 0.6) member. The probabilities they vote high in
the two states are plotted in figures 1c and 1d. The more-expert member can better identify the state ωt,
and so his vote tends to match it more often than that of the less-expert member. So, he is on average more
likely to choose vit = 0 (vit = 1) when ωt = 0 (ωt = 1). In short, expertise is reflected in a flipping across
states in terms of who is most likely to vote for the high interest rate: κME0 ≤ κLE0 , but κME1 ≥ κLE1 . Thus,
the difference in estimated voting probabilities across states and across members (κ̂i0 and κ̂i1) allows one to
distinguish preference versus expertise differences.
4.2 Construction of Confidence Intervals
To compute confidence intervals, the paper uses a Monte-Carlo approach that is similar in spirit to boot-
strapping. 500 different values for first-stage coefficients are drawn from a multivariate normal distribution
whose mean is the vector of estimated coefficients, and whose variance-covariance matrix is the inverse of the
negative Hessian matrix. These draws are then used to generate a distribution over the structural parameters
(and their differences) from which confidence intervals are constructed. We provide the full details of our
simulation approach, which is suggested in King et al. (2000), in the online appendix.
5 The Data
This section describes the construction of the period t voting agenda and the proxies for the prior qRt and
qMt introduced in the previous section. Further information on these constructions is in the online appendix.
5.1 Construction of the agenda
In periods with two unique votes by MPC members (64% of the meetings), we consider the agenda to be the
two observed votes, and set vit = 1 if member i voted for the higher rate. A complication arises in meetings
with unanimous votes since we do not directly observe which alternative was under consideration. To address
this, we use a survey of around 30-50 market economists conducted by Reuters in the days leading up to the
MPC meetings. The survey asks respondents to predict the outcome of MPC voting by writing a probability
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(d) Sincere Model: Information Difference, State=1
Figure 1: Distinguishing Information and Preferences: Sincere Voting
Notes: This figure shows the theoretical probability, conditional on the unknown state of the economy, that a
member votes for the high interest rate (Pr (vit = 1)). These probabilities correspond to κ0 and κ1 in the model.
The figures plot these probabilities as a function of the prior belief that the economy is in an inflationary state
(qt) and for different values of preferences and expertise. Figures 1a and 1b show that more hawkish individuals
(higher θ), given a fixed value of expertise (σ), are more likely to vote for the high rate across both inflationary
states (κH0 ≥ κD0 and κH1 ≥ κD1 ). Figures 1c and 1d show that expertise has a different effect on the probability
that a member votes high in each state. Individuals with greater expertise, give a fixed value of bias, are more
likely to vote for a rate that matches the inflationary state such that the more expert member is less likely to
vote for the high rate in the low state and more likely to vote for the high rate in the high state (κME0 ≤ κLE0 but
κME1 ≥ κLE1 ).
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distribution over possible interest rate choices.9 Because of the fairly large cross-sectional sample size and
the prominence of the participating institutions, the average beliefs in the survey data can be taken as a
good measure of conventional wisdom about inflationary pressures. When votes are unanimous, we take the
agenda to be the two rates on which the survey places the highest average probabilities.10 Figure 2 shows
the voting data for MPC members classified by whether they are internal or external. This figure illustrates
that both internal and external members vote high (vit = 1) and low (vit = 0) across the whole sample.
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Figure 2: Percentage of Internal and External Members who choose the higher interest rate
Notes: This figure shows the percentage of internal (blue X) and external (red dot) members within a given MPC
meeting who vote for the higher interest rate calculated using the empirical data corresponding to the model
variable vit. Both types of member regularly vote for high and low interest rates.
5.2 Proxies for the common prior
The first proxy qRt comes directly from the Reuter’s survey: q
R
t is the average probability the survey placed
on the higher rate in the agenda over the total average probability placed on both rates in the agenda.
The second proxy qMt comes from the cross-section of prices for short sterling futures options the first day
(Wednesday) of the MPC meeting.11 This data aggregates the opinions of a large number of agents (all
traders in the sterling options market) and, in contrast to the Reuters data, these opinions are backed
by real money and so potentially less subjective and manipulable. Short sterling futures contracts are
effectively an option on 3 month LIBOR. The Bank of England computes the expected value of 3 month
LIBOR consistent with a risk neutral trader being willing to hold the option at each observed price. This
yields a distribution over risk-neutral traders’ beliefs on 3 month LIBOR. The Bank then publishes the
0.05, 0.15, . . . , 0.95 percentiles of this CDF. We subtract the actual value of LIBOR on the Wednesday of
the MPC meeting (before the decision is made on the Thursday) to express the CDF in terms of traders’
9In fact the exact question varied over time. In the online appendix, full details are provided of the surveys and the five
meetings (out of 142 for which we have voting data) for which we have no Reuters survey data.
10We confirm that the unanimous decision reached by the MPC is one of the interest rates on which the market puts highest
probability, which is itself an important test of the quality of the Reuters survey.
11Full details about these data, as well as the data itself, are provided by the Bank of England (see Bank of England (2011)
and Lynch and Panigirtzoglou (2008)). There are four periods in which options price data are missing due to thin or illiquid
short-sterling options markets.
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beliefs on changes in 3 month LIBOR. Since base rate changes are made in discrete 25 point movements
while traders’ beliefs are continuous, we consider beliefs that lie within 12.5 basis points on either side of the
corresponding change to be beliefs associated with that change being more likely. As we only observe certain
percentiles of the cdf, we linearly interpolate between the two percentiles in which a rate change falls.
Both qRt and q
M
t have weaknesses, but perhaps the biggest is that they predict the outcome of MPC voting
rather than the realized inflationary shock. Consider however an observer of the committee who holds the
prior belief qt that the economy is in the inflationary state. Since the probability that each member votes
high is increasing in qt, then the observer’s prediction on the MPC outcome will also be increasing in qt. So
while qRt and q
M
t do not directly measure qt, at least their rank correlation should be high. Also important
to emphasize is that the relationship between qt and the proxies is estimated, not assumed.
6 Results
This section presents the main results from the estimation exercise. Ideally one would include 27 individual
dummy variables in the first-stage and recover θi and σi for each voter, but there are too few observations
per member to allow for this approach. Instead, the paper takes Di to be a dummy variable that divides
MPC voters into two groups A and B, and recovers and compares group-level parameters θA, σA, θB , and
σB .
6.1 Differences between internal and external members
In the baseline specification, Di = 1 (Di = 0) if member i is an internal (external) member. To control for
members’ potentially having different disutilities from errors in states 0 and 1 depending on the agenda, we
include in Zt a dummy variable indicating if meeting t had at least one choice on the agenda to hike interest
rates—the most common such meetings are those that have a choice of no change and a choice of raising by
25 basis points.
Table 2 contains point estimates and p-values for the first stage parameters in the baseline specification
under the “Internal Baseline” heading. The main point of interest is the large and highly significant relation-
ship between the prior qt and the Reuter’s proxy q
R
t —see coefficient α1 in the table—while the relationship
between qt and q
M
t is small and insignificant. This indicates that the Reuter’s survey data is a good predictor
of the prior to which market price data adds little. As indicated by the positive and significant estimates for
β2 and γ2, higher values of q
R
t are also associated with a higher probability that members vote high in both
states of the world. However, higher values of qMt are only associated with members voting high more often
in state 0.
Table 3 presents the results of the second stage using the “Internal Baseline” specification. The σ
estimates, which are invariant to sincere or strategic behavior, indicate that internal and external members
form precise (though not perfect) private assessments of economic conditions. In section 7 we provide a
measure for how much the private signal improves individual decision making. For now we simply point out
that heterogeneity in views is an important driver of heterogeneity in observed votes. If two members share
the same preferences and expertise, they will still in general receive different signals that may lead them to
vote for different rates. It is notable that differences in private assessments persist even after the committee
has met and discussed current conditions at length. This means that voting is an important mechanism
to fully incorporate individual members’ views in the final decision, suggesting that a committee in which
all members have voting rights has advantages over a single decision maker with an advisory committee.
Finally, as can be seen from the difference entry, internal members are estimated to receive more precise
private signals than externals.
Extracting the θ parameters requires one to specify whether voting is sincere or strategic. In the sincere
case, we estimate a preference difference that is large in magnitude and significant, with external members
systematically more dovish than internals. This finding is in line with the existing literature discussed
above. With strategic voting, however, external and internal members are estimated to have nearly identical
preferences. Although the difference remains significant, the point estimates are very close together—the
difference falls from 0.3 under sincere voting to 0.02 if voting is strategic.
These results indicate that members of the committee differ along a dimension that corresponds precisely
to a variable that the government (or, more generally, the committee designer) controls directly—whether
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Table 2: First Stage Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Internal Insider Internal Internal
Baseline Baseline Alternative 1 Alternative 2
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
α0 (constant) -2.35 0.01 -3.41 0.00 -2.50 0.01 -2.43 0.01
α1 (Reuter’s) 5.75 0.00 5.54 0.00 5.23 0.00 4.83 0.00
α1 (market) -0.55 0.39 1.85 0.18 0.31 0.44 0.47 0.40
β0 (constant) -6.89 0.00 -5.01 0.00 -6.18 0.00 -6.14 0.00
β1 (Di, group dummy) -1.02 0.26 -2.01 0.14 -0.92 0.28 -1.29 0.21
β2 (Reuter’s) 2.18 0.02 2.14 0.05 3.38 0.01 3.63 0.00
β3 (market) 4.77 0.01 2.6 0.06 3.61 0.05 3.21 0.05
β4 (Reuter’s x Di) 2.58 0.02 1.9 0.11 2.05 0.07 1.97 0.05
β5 (market x Di) 0.48 0.43 2.53 0.2 0.71 0.40 1.36 0.30
β61 (hike) 1.69 0.00 0.83 0.11 1.14 0.07 1.00 0.10
β62 (Status quo H) -0.63 0.11 -0.75 0.08
β63 (Reuter’s x IR) 0.73 0.06
γ0 (constant) -1.03 0.09 -0.64 0.17 -2.26 0.01 -2.09 0.01
γ1 (Di, group dummy) -4.1 0.00 -1.74 0.13 -3.22 0.00 -3.32 0.00
γ2 (Reuter’s) 2.54 0.00 2.1 0.00 2.82 0.00 2.77 0.00
γ3 (market) -0.33 0.40 0.29 0.39 -0.82 0.26 -1.13 0.20
γ4 (Reuter’s x Di) 2.74 0.02 6.13 0.00 3.91 0.00 4.39 0.00
γ5 (market x Di) 8.57 0.00 1.44 0.33 5.40 0.02 5.2 0.01
γ61 (hike) 1.46 0.00 0.55 0.08 2.68 0.00 2.7 0.00
γ62 (Status quo H) 1.10 0.00 1.16 0.00
γ63 (Reuter’s x IR) -0.21 0.25
Notes: This table shows the results of the first stage estimation of (6). Each column represents a different
specification. The first is the baseline results with members split according to whether they are internal or
external. The second instead uses the split of insiders and outsider, but the baseline specification in terms of other
regressors. The last two specifications again use the internal-external split, but consider additional covariates in
the first stage regression. Each row in each column contains the coefficient estimates (first) and significance is
reported using p-values (second).
Table 3: Baseline Estimates of Structural Parameters
(1) (2) (3)
Internal External Difference
σ 0.39 0.54 -0.15
95% Range 0.35 0.48 0.45 0.7 -0.3 -0.02
θ(SIN) 0.65 0.34 0.30
95% Range 0.52 0.76 0.26 0.44 0.18 0.4
θ(STR) 0.54 0.51 0.02
95% Range 0.43 0.48 0.4 0.62 0.02 0.05
Notes: This table shows the structural estimates for internal (column 1) and external (column 2) members, as
well as the difference between them (column 3). The rows report the estimates for the precision parameter (σ),
as well as preferences under sincere voting (θ(SIN)) and strategic voting (θ(STR)). 95% confidence intervals are
reported below each point estimate.
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to appoint external members. The estimates show that this institutional design feature has measurable
consequences that affect decision making (we will quantify the size of the effects below). Unfortunately
the results do not determine whether internal and external members behave differently because they have
fundamentally different characteristics or because there is something about serving in an internal or external
capacity that changes preferences and belief formation. It could be that internal members become more
inflation-averse, or develop greater expertise, via their experience in central banks, and that they take this
with them onto the MPC. Alternatively, it could be driven by the nature of their position. For instance,
internals might have more expertise because of more direct control of the work streams (as the internal
members are also senior management of the Bank), while external members, who typically serve as part-
time monetary policymakers, are hindered because they have less time to spend getting on top of the large
amounts of analysis that is provided.
One way to shed some light on the relevance of these channels is to use the fact that some newly-appointed
internals have come from careers in central banking (especially within the Bank of England), while others
have come from other backgrounds, so that their tenure on the MPC coincides with their first central bank
job. Analogously, one external member is a former Bank of England central banker. We redefine our internal
group to instead be a group of central bank insiders by setting Di = 1 if member i had previously worked in
the Bank of England or another central bank prior to taking their position on the MPC. The insider group
pools insider-externals (former central bankers serving as externals) and insider-internals (career central
bankers) while the outsider group consists entirely of people who are coming to the MPC from something
other than central banking. As can be seen in table 1, this converts one external members (Charles Goodhart)
into an insider and about half the internal members (such as Charlie Bean) to outsiders.
The second column of table 2 presents the first stage estimates for this specification and figure 3 shows
the estimate, and 95% confidence interval, of the difference in parameters between insider and outsider
members recovered from the second stage (internal and external member differences are shown for ease of
comparison). Given that the groups are closely over-lapping, it is no surprise that comparisons between
insiders and outsiders in terms of structural parameters are similar to those between internal and external
members. Of more interest is the difference-in-differences. Insiders seem to be even more hawkish relative to
their outsider colleagues than internals are relative to externals. This can only be explained by the fact that
insider-externals are more hawkish than outsider-internals, which suggests that it is the experience of central
banking rather than the institutional responsibilities of being an internal that lead to hawkishness.12 On
the expertise side, the two alternative ways of splitting the data lead to almost exactly the same difference
meaning that outsider-internals have as much expertise as insider-externals. If there is increased expertise
from prior experience of central banking, this is offset by being an external member. This might be because
it is a part-time position, or because these members have less control over the development of work and less
information about other areas of the Bank’s business such as financial stability.
6.2 Sincere versus strategic model
Given the difference in structural parameters between the sincere and strategic models, one question that
arises is: which model better explains the data? To answer it we conduct a test relying on out-of-sample
prediction. That is, we implement our estimation procedure on a subsample of the data, and then use
the point estimates under the sincere and strategic specifications to generate predictions about the votes
associated with the meetings not used in the estimation stage. We use four splits of the data, each one with
the out-of-sample data corresponding to roughly one third of the meetings, to conduct the analysis.
The baseline test is to compute the mean absolute value of the difference between observed individual
votes and the predicted probability of individual votes’ being high given the observed meeting and individual
characteristics. In each split, the sincere model performs marginally better; the mean absolute deviation
under the sincere model is between 1.4 and 3.3 percentage points lower than under the strategic model.13
12It might be that long periods of work in central banks make economists more hawkish, or that those who are inflation-averse
self-select into careers in central banking (or thrive in them to the point of becoming expert enough to be selected to the MPC).
13An alternative test discussed in the online appendix relies on individual vote classification. A model predicts a high (low)
vote if the predicted probability of voting high is above (below) some cutoff value between 0 and 1. The main finding is that for
some values of the cutoff, the prediction error of the two models is nearly identical, while for others the sincere model performs
better (by around 3 to 5 percentage points). In contrast, for no split of the data do we find cutoffs for which the strategic model
meaningfully outperforms the sincere model.
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Figure 3: Internal vs External or Insider vs Outsider?
Notes: This figure shows, for expertise estimates (left panel) and preference estimates (right panel), the estimated
difference between internal and external members (top lines of the figure labeled “Int vs Ext”), and between insiders
and outsiders (bottom lines of the figure labeled “Ins vs Out”). The dot represents the mean difference for each
parameter, while the 95% confidence interval is presented as the line around the dot. The estimated expertise
gaps are almost identical for internal and insider members. Insider members are somewhat more hawkish relative
to outsiders than internal are to external members.
Thus, in the rest of the paper we focus on the estimates generated under the sincere model and include the
ones for the strategic specification in the online appendix.
6.3 Differences between other groups
We also examine various other splits of the MPC besides internal and external. These include splits based
on the members’ career background prior to joining the committee (whether members worked in the private
sector, or were academics), based on whether members hold a PhD, and based on whether members were
older than the median age of new MPC members, 49, when joining the MPC.14 To save on space, we simply
discuss the results and present the details in the online appendix. In all cases members’ signals are estimated
to be drawn from precise distributions similar to the results for internal and external members. However,
there are no statistically significant differences between the different splits in terms of preference or expertise
parameters. This suggests that changing the mix of committee members in terms of career background,
education, or age is unlikely to result in substantively different decision making.
6.4 Robustness of the baseline results
In order to test the robustness of the baseline results, we also examine alternative meeting controls in the
first stage regression. Here we discuss two alternative specifications though we have tried many others with
no change in the results. In the first we introduce a second agenda indicator variable to capture whether
14A table in the online appendix contains the classification of each member according to these criteria.
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the high interest rate also corresponds to the status quo decision of no change in rates. Along with the
first agenda indicator, whether a hike is on the agenda, this second agenda variable is indeed a significant
predictor of individual votes (see estimates of β61, β62, γ61, and γ62 in the third column of table 2), but the
values of the structural parameters and relevant differences are unchanged.
In the second alternative we attempt to address a concern about our qRt proxy, the one with the most
predictive power in the first stage regressions. In every meeting, members have access to information that
is also available to the entire market, as well as proprietary information from within the Bank that market
participants do not have. The former information is reflected in our proxies, while the latter is not. If the
Bank’s information is the main driver of voters’ beliefs, our estimation approach might be problematic. In
meetings that coincide with the preparation of a quarterly Inflation Report (IR), voters have a particularly
large amount of information available before voting (updated staff forecasts of macro variables) that the
market does not see until after the meeting. So, if Bank information is the main source of information from
which voters derive their prior beliefs, one would expect our proxies to be less correlated with voting high
in IR months. To test this idea, we introduce an interaction between qR and an IR month dummy into the
κi0 and κi1 terms. In fact the coefficient on the interaction term is estimated to be positive and significant
in the κi0 equation—meaning that economists’ predictions on the MPC decision are even more correlated
with votes in the low state in IR months—while the equivalent coefficient in the κi1 equation is estimated
negative but insignificant. Regardless, the values of the structural differences are unchanged.
To conclude our robustness exercises, we take medians of the structural parameter distributions (rather
than means as described in section 4.2), and also take means across members (rather than across time).
These are done using the first stage estimates from the “Internal Baseline” specification. The qualitative
features of the second stage results are identical.
Overall, our results highlight three interesting messages. First, the main driver of voting differences
between most splits of the MPC is differences in beliefs on economic conditions, not differences in preferences
or biases. This is notable given that preference differences (typically) receive more attention in the monetary
literature. Second, for some splits considered, members are ex-ante identical in terms of both preferences and
expertise. This means, for example, that replacing older members with younger members or vice versa might
have little effect on decision making. Third, as already discussed, the one split on which members do differ
in terms of expertise and preferences corresponds to a committee design feature—the appointment, or not,
of external members. We now quantify the extent to which the committee aggregates private information,
as well as the effect of adding external members to the MPC on decision-making quality.
7 The effect of different committee sizes
Our finding that members draw imperfect private signals on economic conditions suggests that the MPC
adds value compared to individual decision making by aggregating dispersed knowledge. The main goal of
this section is to quantify this gain with counterfactual simulations. A secondary goal is to assess whether
externals’ having different preferences from internals can improve decision making in spite of their having
lower signal precisions.
The measure of decision-making quality we adopt is the unconditional probability the decision equals the
state. This corresponds to the utility function of a committee designer with a neutral bias of θ = 0.5, which
appears to correspond to the Bank’s explicitly stated preferences. In terms of the notation introduced in
section 4, for a committee of size N (odd), this probability is
qt
N∑
m=N+12
(
N
m
)
κm1t (1− κ1t)N−m + (1− qt)
N∑
m=N+12
(
N
m
)
κN−m0t (1− κ0t)m (11)
where κωt is the probability a committee member votes high in state ωt given qt.
15 We compute the κ terms
for different values of the structural parameters θ and σ under the sincere voting assumption. The results
15The committees we consider are homogenous with respect to the structural parameters, so we do not introduce an i index.
We calculate the expression for odd-sized committees and use piecewise cubic interpolation between the resulting probabilities
for our figures.
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for strategic voting are very similar.
An important caveat should be heeded when interpreting the counterfactuals. We cannot measure the
effect that a member’s presence had on other members’ voting behavior through deliberation or any other
interactions. It could be that such peer effects are important, for example the presence of a particular
member might affect other members’ beliefs. If this were so, the following simulations should be interpreted
as removing the voting rights from various subsets of members, but allowing them to participate in the rest
of the committee activities as is the case on advisory committees.
To examine the effect of committee size on performance, we consider a committee whose members share
the preferences and expertise of the average internal member as reported in table 3 (θ = 0.6 and σ = 0.39)
and which faces an economy with maximum uncertainty (qt = 0.5). Figure 4a presents the results, with
the shaded area corresponding to the 95% confidence intervals. Despite high uncertainty, a committee of
internals has a high probability of getting the decision correct. Even a single internal gets the decision
right about 90% of the time (though the range of estimates is 84% to 93%). As a comparison, an internal
member who drew no private signal would always vote high, and so on average get the decision right in 50%
of meetings.16 Private information improves the individual internal decision maker by about 40 percentage
points in the most uncertain economic times. Of course, as uncertainty about the state of the economy
declines, and the prior moves toward either zero or one, the value of private signals is reduced. At the
same time, there is a significant improvement in decision quality as more members are added. For example,
expanding the committee size from one to five members increases the probability of a correct decision by
about nine percentage points.
Taken at face value, the results indicate a larger committee is always better. As a practical matter,
though, larger committees also entail additional coordination and infrastructure costs. Some authors have
also argued that increasing the number of members makes deliberation more difficult (Furnham, 1997), and
increases the costs of free-riding in terms of information acquisition (Sibert, 2006). So, the marginal benefit
of an additional member is also important to know. While we measure it to be positive and significant up to
nine members, it is very small beyond five members. Intuitively speaking, internal members receive precise
enough signals that most of the gains from information aggregation are realized with a small number of
experts. While we do not wish to propose a theory of optimal committee size, our results are nevertheless
striking. A group of five internal members over the meetings in our sample is predicted to make just a few
errors. Interestingly, Napier and Gershenfeld (1999) argue that this size is optimal (or close to optimal) in
most situations. However, as we see below, our finding depends crucially on the level of expertise of the
appointed members.
In figure 4b, we simulate the performance of a committee of externals. Since they are estimated to
have lower expertise than internals, this committee performs worse for all sizes. Still, a committee of nine
members gets the decision right in 95% of meetings. More substantively, the marginal benefit of group size
does not taper off as quickly and adding more experts can meaningfully improve decision making.
To push the point on lower-expertise committees further, figure 5 presents results for a group of neutral
non-experts with θ = 0.5 and σ = 1, whom one could imagine being members of the government or public with
little background in monetary policy. This group would need around 30 members to match the performance
of the five-member internal committee.
While internal committees outperform external ones due to better information, our last set of results
analyzes whether they can improve decision making due to their different preferences. To examine this, we
see how how internals’ performance relative to externals varies with the prior qt across different committee
sizes. Figure 6a plots by how much internals outperform externals when qt = 0.75, and shows that, for high
committee sizes, externals perform as well as internals. Intuitively, internals members are biased towards
high rates, and when the prior favors high rates, externals are more likely to follow private signals that
point towards low rates. But for exactly the reverse logic, internals outperform externals when qt = 0.25
by more than when qt = 0.5, as shown in figure 6b. In this sense, preference diversity can both improve
and worsen performance from meeting to meeting. If qt is roughly uniform, though, gains from preference
diversity cancel the losses, so that externals still do worse overall.
In terms of real-world implications, our results show that combining four external members with five
internal ones, as the Bank of England does, might not improve decision making much while also generating
16In a model with no private signals, a banker chooses the high rate if and only if θi ≥ 1 − qt. So when qt < 1 − θi the
probability of a correct decision is 1− qt and otherwise is qt.
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(a) A committee of internal members
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(b) A committee of external members
Figure 4: The implied likelihood that different MPC Compositions get the right decision
Notes: This figure shows the probability that a committee makes the correct interest rate decision across different
committee sizes for a fixed value of the prior (qt = 0.5). The probability is calculated under the assumption of
sincere voting using the estimated structural parameters presented in table 3. Figure 4a and figure 4b display
the result for committees of internal and external members, respectively. The figure shows that internal members
outperform external members in terms of the probability of making the correct decision across all committee sizes.
Further, the figure shows that there are gains to larger committees, though these taper off, particularly for internal
committees, for levels above five members.
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Figure 5: Probability a committee of non-experts gets the right decision
Notes: This figure shows the probability that a committee with non-expert members (i.e. σ = 1 and θ = 0.5)
makes the correct interest rate decision across different committee sizes for a fixed value of the prior (qt = 0.5). The
probability is calculated under the assumption of sincere voting. The figures shows that a non-expert committee
would require around 30 members to exhibit a level of performance similar to a committee of five internal members
(dashed line).
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(a) Internals advantage over externals: qt = 0.75
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(b) Internal advantage over externals: qt = 0.25
Figure 6: The Gains From Internal Members
Notes: This figure shows the difference in the probability of making the correct interest rate decision between
a committee of internal and external members across different sizes. The differences are calculated under the
assumption of sincere voting and use the estimated structural parameters presented in table 3. Figure 6a and
figure 6b display the result when the prior is 0.75 and 0.25, respectively. The figure shows that given the estimated
values of expertise, the preferences of external members are not sufficient to offset the preference bias of internal
members. For instance, we observe that even for a relatively high value of the prior (qt = 0.75 in figure 6a),
when internal preferences may tilt this type of committees towards adopting higher rates, a committee of external
members does not exhibit a better performance than a committee of internal members.
18
potential costs. Rather than assert that external members literally add no value, we believe our estimates
show that the justification for their inclusion needs more careful thinking. For example, perhaps the presence
of external members increases diversity in ways that our model does not capture.
8 Conclusion
Taken together, our results give an empirically novel view of monetary policymaking by committee and
address important issues in committee design. Reis (2013) argues that committees are preferred to individual
decision makers for any of a four main virtues: (i) pooling of private information, (ii) providing a diversity
of views which generates discussion of the evidence for and against different views, (iii) guarding against
autocratic power, and (iv) making less volatile decisions. Our paper directly addresses the first of these, and
shows that groups significantly outperform individuals due to information aggregation. Another insight is
that adding dovish members (externals) to a group of hawkish ones (internals) does not necessarily improve
average decision making quality through preference moderation.
The results and analysis can also shed light on the structure of other important committees like the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and European Central Bank Governing Council (ECB). At the
Bank of England, a small committee appears desirable because the marginal benefit of additional members
due to information pooling declines rather quickly. From this perspective, the 19-member FOMC and 24-
member ECB are potentially too big when one considers the costs of more members. Of course, in economies
with more regional heterogeneity like the US or euro area, drawing on a greater number of views may be
more important for determining the right interest rate.
We find one type of appointee (internals) forms, on average, more precise assessments than another
(externals). This raises the question of whether such differences exist on other committees with different
member types, and whether the composition of these committees is optimal. For example, Reis (2013) argues
that one justification for the inclusion of regional Fed Presidents on the FOMC is that they contribute new
ideas. An approach similar to ours using policy preference data from the FOMC could help determine
whether Presidents indeed have more (or less) expertise than the Fed Governors based in Washington DC.
One argument in favor of Presidents having more expertise is that each has a reasonably large staff and
budget which might encourage competition in the market for economic analysis (Goodfriend, 1999). The
Fed Governors, by comparison, have to rely mostly on the analysis of the Board of Governors’ staff, which
is shared amongst FOMC members. At the Bank of England, it is the externals who only have a small staff
and these are the group found to have less expertise.
One note of caution is that the correct decision might depend on multiple dimensions, some of which
externals have more expertise on than internals. A model that explicitly built in such diversity would be
a natural extension of our work. Moreover, the committee structure may affect deliberation and therefore
the evolution each member’s views. We leave these issues to future research. Nevertheless, the paper is, to
our knowledge, the first to decompose voting heterogeneity on a monetary policy committee into distinct
preference and signal components, and as such provides potentially valuable facts for moving the debate on
monetary policymaking by committee forward.
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